in general, and pay-for-performance specifically, have a significant role to play in the improvement of health care quality in the United States. [5] [6] [7] Pay-for-performance is focused on the management of chronic diseases, such as hyperlipidemia, diabetes, and hypertension. In the United States, over 900,000 people die from cardiovascular disease and diabetes each year, and chronic diseases, including cancer, account for over 75% of medical care costs and affect over 130 million people each year. 8 Unfortunately, many patients with these conditions are undertreated and do not achieve their therapeutic goals, such as target blood pressure or lipid levels. For example, only 37% of people with hypertension have their blood pressure controlled and only 65% of hypertensive patients are being treated. 9 Therefore, creating incentives to better control chronic diseases makes conceptual sense.
Ideally pay-for-performance in chronic diseases would be based on outcomes that really matter to patients, such as death, morbidity, and disability. Instead, many of the quality metrics used in pay-for-performance address process measures (e.g., the percentage of diabetic patients who receive glycosylated hemoglobin [HbA 1c ] testing or a lipid profile each year). The few measures that attempt to address clinical outcomes actually measure surrogate markers like HbA 1c , low-density-lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol, and blood pressure (Table 1) . 10 Given this information, what if evidence emerged that reaching a lower LDL cholesterol level, blood pressure, or HbA 1c did not always lead to better outcomes? 11 If morbidity and mortality are the true targets of pay-for-performance, and if payfor-performance is to be a major part of the solution to the current health care problem, then we should be sure that the outcome measures we use are accurate surrogates and that the incentives we create are the right ones. Several recently published and high-profile studies questioned these assumptions and raised concerns about the appropriateness of current pay-for-performance measures.
Recent studies and questions about the use of surrogate markers. LDL cholesterol has long been accepted as a surrogate marker for coronary artery disease (CAD) mortality and is a widely used quality measure. Epidemiologic data show that people with high cholesterol have a higher incidence of CAD, and some clinical trials have found that lowering LDL cholesterol was associated with significant reductions in cardiovascular mortality. 12, 13 cholesterolemia Enhances Atherosclerosis Regression (ENHANCE) trial raise questions about using LDL cholesterol as a quality measure. ENHANCE evaluated whether adding a cholesterol-absorption inhibitor (ezetimibe) to maximum doses of the hydroxymethylglutarylcoenzyme A reductase inhibitor simvastatin would slow the rate of atherosclerosis progression for patients with familial hypercholesterolemia. 14 While patients randomized to receive ezetimibe plus simvastatin achieved significantly lower concentrations of LDL cholesterol than patients who received simvastatin alone (141 mg/ dL versus 193 mg/dL), these lower LDL cholesterol levels were not associated with reductions in atherosclerosis as assessed with the carotid intima-media thickness. There are many possible explanations for the study results, and a number of limitations exist with the use of the carotid intima-media thickness as a measure of coronary atherosclerosis and cardiac risk. 15 Nevertheless, the ENHANCE trial results raise questions as to whether or not lowering LDL cholesterol levels alone is a specific enough measure of quality.
Another recent study raises similar questions about lowering blood pressure. Hypertension is an important risk factor for cardiovascular disease and stroke, and the evidence is clear that lowering blood pressure reduces the risk of myocardial infarction and stroke. 16, 17 The Ongoing Telmisartan Alone and in Combination with Ramipril Global Endpoint (ONTARGET) trial evaluated whether a regimen combining the reninangiotensin blockers telmisartan and ramipril for patients with vascular disease or high-risk diabetes resulted in greater improvements in cardiovascular outcomes than each agent alone. 18 Patients receiving combination therapy had mean blood pressures that were 2-3 mm Hg lower than patients treated with ramipril alone. Although this magnitude of In addition, adverse events and poor renal outcomes were more frequent with combination therapy. 18, 19 Several recent diabetes studies also raise similar concerns about the adequacy of HbA 1c as a surrogate marker. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute sponsored the Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes (ACCORD) trial, which compared intensive glucose lowering with a goal HbA 1c of <6.0% to less-intensive glucose control with an HbA 1c goal of 7.0% for diabetic patients at high risk of cardiovascular outcomes. 20 The trial was suspended in early 2008 because of the higher risk of death observed in the intensive glucose group, which is contrary to the conventional belief that patients with diabetes should achieve an HbA 1c that is as low as safely possible. 21 Two other clinical trials that included patients with diabetesthe Veterans Affairs Diabetes Trial (VADT) and the Action in Diabetes and Vascular Disease: Preterax and Diamicron Modified Release Controlled Evaluation (ADVANCE) trial-found no mortality benefit or reduction in cardiovascular events with intensive glucose control and lower HbA 1c . 22, 23 In addition, several highly publicized meta-analyses of the adverse cardiovascular outcomes associated with rosiglitazone questioned the potentially simplistic goal of merely achieving a low HbA 1c level. 24, 25 Implications of these trials for pay-for-performance. Few would argue that cholesterol, blood pressure, and HbA 1c control are not important targets of therapy and care in a modern, quality-focused, health care system. But these studies add to questions about how closely these proliferating quality measures really track the true quality of care and whether they will lead to improved endpoint outcomes. 12, [26] [27] [28] If the recent failure of the Medicare Health Support's disease-management demonstration project is an example of the danger of overreliance on intermediate measures, in combination with weak research evidence, then pay-forperformance is in similar trouble. 11, 29 Physicians and practices are creating systems to collect data on the percentages of their patients who have reached targeted LDL cholesterol, HbA 1c , or blood pressure levels, and considerable time, energy, and money are being invested for this endeavor. 30, 31 Just as patients in the United States rely on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to make sure their medications are safe and effective for use, providers should rely on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Committee for Quality Assurance, and other organizations to be sure that quality measures are safe and effective before more resources are poured into pay-for-performance. The considerable criticism directed toward FDA because of the lack of resources needed to evaluate drug safety after the approval process portends a similar issue with continual reevaluation of pay-for-performance quality measures.
Lessons learned. Several lessons can be learned from these clinical trial results that may help as the United States and other countries continue to elevate pay-for-performance as a solution for rising health care costs.
These trials demonstrate that it is not only important whether quality goals are met but also how they are met. For example, the ENHANCE trial results suggest that the lower LDL cholesterol achieved by ezetimibe, which was approved by FDA for marketing on the basis of its ability to lower LDL cholesterol, may not have the same effect on atherosclerosis and clinical events that statins have been widely demonstrated to have. There may be other mechanisms by which statins exert their effect, such as through C-reactive protein, 32 which underscores the importance of valuing how as well as if these clinical targets are achieved. Similarly, the ONTARGET trial results and the recent meta-analyses of rosiglitazone suggest that, not only should incentives be created to achieve specific blood pressure and HbA 1c levels, the best ways to reach those targets should be established. Outlining specific care pathways or evidence-based medication use as part of these clinical targets may be a way to improve these performance measures (Table 1) . Pay-forperformance could be based on entire pathways of care-from diagnosis to management to disposition-rather than based solely on specific therapies or laboratory results.
The clinical trials underscore the need for flexible incentives that can respond to new information and efficiently incorporate new evidence. A health care system that needs to improve quality quickly will often need to use surrogate measures to make informed decisions about clinical targets when true outcome data are not available. However, the time pressures cannot absolve the system from putting in place a robust mechanism for updating (and potentially suspending) these quality measures in the face of new evidence (e.g., Phase IV trials in drug development). Should hospitals, insurers, and providers continue to be paid based solely on whether they achieve these surrogate targets? It could be argued that it is poor quality care to have lowered a diabetic patient's LDL cholesterol to <100 mg/dL using ezetimibe if the option exists to use a statin, considering the evidence presented above.
Similarly, is the last blood pressure measurement for a patient with hypertension of <140/90 mm Hg a good surrogate marker for quality care if the patient is on combined angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitor and angiotensin II-receptorblocker therapy when the option exists to control blood pressure using one drug or the other? Perhaps payfor-performance contracts should have a mechanism in place to update the performance measures midyear, in addition to routine annual review, if data emerge that question the validity of the performance measure (and the organizing bodies in quality measurement agree) and the risks to patients or to the health system are too great to continue through the contract.
We do not aim to question the concept of pay-for-performance, which is intuitively sound, or to question the validity of all intermediate outcomes. We do, however, question the selection of these particular measures as they are currently structured and emphasize the need to update them when new evidence emerges. What then should we do for LDL cholesterol, blood pressure, and HbA 1c in the meantime? Perhaps we should drop these measures, and any other questionable measures, entirely from pay-for-performance while waiting for clarifying data. This probably is the wrong solution, knowing that evidence is always evolving. More reasonably, we should aim to make these important measures more specific, open to revision, and responsive to new evidence (Table 1) . These tasks are difficult to accomplish considering the mutable nature of evidence and the nearly impossible task of formally outlining every specific strategy for achieving surrogate targets. The solution, however, is not to simply ignore the problem and move on. When it comes to quality, stubbornly focusing on the wrong surrogate measures of true performance will lead us, and our patients, in the wrong direction.
